Performance and ownership in the governance of urban water by García Rubio, Miguel Ángel et al.
 - 1 - 
 
 
FEG WORKING PAPER SERIES 
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO FEG 
 
 
FEG WORKING PAPERS SERIES 
Documentos de trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y 
Empresariales de la Universidad de Granada 
 
 







Performance and ownership in the governance of urban water 
M. A. García-Rubio, F. González-Gómez, J. Guardiola 
INTRODUCIR TÍTULO RESPETANDO COLOR 








BIBLIOTECA FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS 
ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES 
http://www.ugr.es/~biblio/biblioteca_ugr/bibliotecas_centros/economicas/index.html 
 
 - 2 - 














Department of Applied Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universidad de 
Granada. 
 
Contact information: Miguel A. García-Rubio. Department of Applied Economics, 
Faculty of Economics and Business, Universidad de Granada. Campus de Cartuja, 










 - 3 - 
 
 






In this paper the differences in terms of performance between public and the private 
governance in urban water management are investigated. A statistical ranking is 
implemented to determine programmatic efficiency differences in DEA, using an 
incomplete panel data that gathers information on 20 water utilities in Andalusia, in 
Southern Spain. In the model, labour and operational costs are considered as inputs. The 
volume of revenue water, the number of connections and the network length are used as 
outputs. The analysis indicates that private management is more efficient. The 
efficiency indicators adjusted by a variable related to quality are estimated and 
demonstrate that privatization of the service does not mean any loss in terms of quality. 
However, there are no significant differences between both types of management 
including as a desirable input hydraulic yield as a proxy of the degree of network 
renovation. A lower hydraulic efficiency in private management would suggest that the 
need to make significant investments could be an important factor when making the 
decision to privatize the management of the urban water service. 
  





In developing nations the standards demanded of the management of the urban water 
service are increasing. It is not merely sufficient to guarantee the universalization of the 
service, as the population also demands efficient management in terms of the use of 
resources. Within this context, there is currently much debate as to which is the best 
option of ownership: public or private. 
 
The law in some countries permits the privatization of the urban water service. Greater 
efficiency has usually been the main argument used to justify the privatization process, 
which is based on Agency Theory, Public Choice Theory, the numerous objectives dealt 
with by public companies, labour relationships and the process of the choosing the 
managing directors of the service. 
 
There is currently no consensus regarding the superiority of a certain type of ownership 
over the other. Most studies have found no significant evidence between both kinds of 
ownership (Table 1), therefore it is not possible to draw any clear conclusion. Some of 
the open questions are: Is there any kind of relationship between the management option 
and performance that could indicate the superiority of one governance system over the 
other? Which governance style offers better results in terms of social interest? Is 
privatization a way to obtain improvements in business performance? 
  
 




Table 1. Empirical evidence 
 
Superiority of public 
management 
Superiority of private 
management  
Without significant differences  
Mann y Mikesell1,1976 
Bruggink2, 1982 
Lambert et al.3, 1993 
Lynk4, 1993 
Hall y Lobina5, 2002 
 
Morgan6, 1977 
Crain y Zardkoohi7, 1978 
Raffiee et al.8, 1993 
Bhattacharyya et al.9, 1995 
Estache y Trujillo10, 2003 
Picazo-Tadeo et al., 200711, 
200912 
Feigenbaum y Teeples13, 1983 
Byrnes et al.14, 1986 
Fox y Hofler15, 1986 
Teeples et al.16, 1986 
Teeples y Glyer17, 1987 
Bhattacharyya et al., 199418, 199519 
Aida et al.20, 1997 
Shaoul21, 1997 
Ashton, 200022,23 
Ménard y Saussier24, 2000 
Saal y Parker, 200025, 200126 
Estache y Rossi27, 2002 
Faria et al.28, 2005 
García Sánchez29, 2006 
Kirkpatrick et al.30, 2006 
Serpa da Motta y Moreira31, 2006 





The questioning of privatization on the part of some authors34, 35 is related to the nature 
of the industry. Some characteristics of the industry can be highlighted: Firstly, it is 
structured in local monopolies. Secondly, it is extremely difficult to notice the positive 
effects of the competition that should come into existence after privatization. Thirdly, 
the regulatory framework in each country is very important in order to achieve efficient 
performance in a non-competitive environment. Some measures such as benchmarking 
and public tenders to grant licences are not perfect substitutes for a competitive 
environment. The different benchmarking laws and regulatory frameworks from one 
country to another makes searching for evidence in each country an interesting task. 
 
In this study, the nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology is 
applied to a sample of 20 companies from Andalusia in Southern Spain over the period 
1993-2006. Spain can be considered an excellent case in order to carry out studies 
concerning the governance of the urban water sector, as it is one of the few countries 
that grant local governments the possibility to choose between several types styles of 
governance. Nowadays, in this industry there are both public and private companies as a 
result of municipal autonomy. Public companies supply water services to 47 per cent of 
the population and private companies provide this service to 52 per cent of the 
population36. 
 
The DEA technique is adapted to programmatic efficiency estimation. Additionally, 
through the specification of several DEA models, the effect of both quality and of the 
degree of network renovation is evaluated, in order to check if these factors modify the 
level of efficiency in public and private programs. One specific contribution of this 
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paper to the literature on the subject is the fact that it obtains performance 
measurements that can be interpreted as efficiency in the reduction of costs which must 
be taken into account in order to maintain a sufficiently renovated network. Water 
utilities manage a basic need service, therefore their efficiency is of interest to 
companies, but society as a whole is also interested. From an environmental point of 
view, an obsolete network demands a greater exploitation of hydric resources. 
  
The rest of the article is structured as follows: The second section describes the DEA 
model and the methodology used to estimate the programmatic efficiency. The third 
section shows the data and the variables as well as the specified DEA models used in 
the research. The fourth section provides the results of the analysis, and in the last 





Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a technique based on mathematical programming. 
A technological frontier representing the best practices is designed using the inputs and 
outputs from a sample of companies by comparing the position of each company in 
relation to that frontier in terms of a performance index. Therefore, efficiency is a 
relative concept.  
 
The measurement of efficiency in the DEA requires two steps: firstly, to determine the 
characteristics of the technology and the estimation of the technological frontier. 
Secondly, to implement the comparison in terms of a performance index of each 
productive unit of the sample in relation to the technological frontier. In this paper, it is 
assumed that the technology achieves the following axioms: no free lunch, impossibility 
of free production, strong free disposability of inputs and outputs, convexity and 
variable returns to scale. The estimation is performed by using an input-oriented radial 
efficiency index, which represents the maximum possible equiproportional reduction in 
the input vector of inputs, while leaving constant the output vector. Therefore, a DEA-
BCC37 input-oriented envelopment model is used. 
 
One complexity of this method is that multiple optimal solutions can be obtained if the 
sample contains weak units in terms of efficiency –with radial efficiency indexes equal 
to one but slacks different to zero. In this particular case, the DEA-BCC basic model 
can fail to identify every slack, therefore justifying the calculation of a two stage 
process model38. This consists of the estimation of the efficiency indexes ignoring the 
slacks in the first stage, and afterwards the slacks are optimized from the previous 
efficiency results.  
 
Programmatic efficiency estimation is proposed in a seminal study in DEA literature39. 
The objective of this focus is to distinguish between two kinds of efficiency: managerial 
efficiency, which is a result of the management of an individual service provider, and 
programmatic efficiency, which is related to different productive programs. In the 
literature about urban water supply, some productive programs have been considered: 
large and small scale water suppliers20, different geographical areas20, estimation of the 
effect of the institutional reforms40 or public and private management29.   
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The estimation of managerial efficiency assumes that every unit analyzed has the same 
best practices frontier. Its estimation requires the implementation of DEA analysis to all 
of the sample units. In programmatic efficiency estimation this assumption is relaxed, as 
it is understood that every productive program has a different frontier. Therefore, the 
first step consists of the division of the sample into two groups and the implementation 
of the DEA model to each of them. Subsequently, in each group, the original data is 
modified projecting the inefficient units over their own frontier, therefore deleting the 
intra-program differences. Lastly, applying the DEA model to the sample of modified 
data, the potential inter-program differences or programmatic efficiency are obtained. 
 
The Mann-Whitney41 rank test makes it possible to check the following null hypothesis 
(H0): both programs have the same distribution in terms of efficiency values. If this 
hypothesis is rejected, then there will be differences in efficiency between both 
productive programs, and one will be superior to the other.   
  
  
3. Data, variables and model specification  
 
The dataset used in this study consists of an incomplete panel data containing 20 water 
companies in Andalusia, in Southern Spain, over the period 1993-2006. When the 
companies decide to modify their tariffs they have to send the tariff revision file to a 
regulatory body known as the Andalusian Price Comission. The information for this 
dataset has been obtained from the direct examination of these files. Table 2 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. 
 
 









Inputs           
    Labour costs Thousands of euros 5 372.59 5 557.73 23 671.91 721.50 
    Operational costs Thousands of euros 4 528.89 4 714.91 22 734.39 837.76 
Desirable inputs           
    Hydraulic yield Percentage 62.63 7.69 77.76 44.47 
Outputs           
    Water delivery  Thousands of m3 15 769.34 16 742.16 71 354 3 160 
    Connections Number of connections 75 077.79 55 391.23 270 920 23 864 
    Delivery network Kilometres 624.39 695.79 3 130 96 




The estimation of the best practice frontier using DEA could cause a problem in terms 
of lack of degrees of freedom when the number of variables is quite high in relation to 
the number of observations. This drawback means that most of the efficiency 
estimations obtained have a value equal to one, because each unit of analysis is 
compared to itself. In order to avoid this, it is possible to treat each unit as a distinct 
comparative entity in each unit of time, following the proposal made by García-Valiñas 
and Muñiz42. However, this approach requires a relatively stable level of technology 
over a period of time43. Following the Färe, Grosskopf, Lindgren and Roos procedure 
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(FGLR)44, an input based Malmquist productivity index has been estimated, finding a 
low rate of technological improvement in the sector – 0.064% per annum on average 
over the period of analysis-.  
 
In the sector considered in this study, the importance of environmental factors is 
recognized45. Representing the output of a water supply service only through the 
volume of water delivery could be inadequate. In the literature on the subject, the 
existence of economies of customer density46,47 and economies of production 
density48,49 are identified as important in the sector.  
  
A network-dependent industry that is more efficient when increasing its production to 
satisfy the demand from new customers, leaving its network size unchanged, is 
exploiting economies of customer density. The geographical distribution of the 
population supplied is not a variable that can be controlled by the company. The non-
consideration of the unequal population density among companies could penalize those 
that supply area with lower population density. However, this cannot be understood as a 
less efficient performance. Thanassoulis43 solves this problem by including as an output 
the network length variable, which is the same approach followed in this research. 
 
There are economies of production density when as production increases for a given 
network size and a given number of customers, the average variable costs decrease. The 
water consumed by each user is a variable which is not controlled by the company. 
Nevertheless, it could be expected that a company would incur higher costs when it 
supplies the service to many small scale consumers rather than a few large scale ones. 
To take this into account, the number of connections is included as an output. 
 
Regarding the specification of the models used in this study, the basic DEA is 
implemented. Table 3 shows the different models specified in the present research. 
 
 
      Table 3. DEA models 
  
VARIABLE DEA1 DEA2 DEA3 DEA4 
Inputs         
    Labour costs X X X X 
    Operational costs X X X X 
Desirable inputs     
    Hydraulic yield   X X 
Outputs     
    Water delivery X X X X 
    Connections X X X X 
    Delivery network X X X X 




The so-called DEA1 model uses as outputs the volume of water delivery, the network 
length and the number of connections. The volume of water delivery is the most 
frequently used output variable in efficiency analysis in the sector. The other two 
variables are included to consider the aforementioned environmental factors. Therefore, 
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with this model, the net efficiency measurements of the effect of the economies of 
customer density and economies of production density are obtained. As for the included 
inputs, these are the labour costs and other operational costs. Therefore, the 
Thanassoulis approach43 is followed, which adapts the DEA method in order to estimate 
the potential cost savings in water distribution. From this basic model, the additional 
variables are included.  
 
The DEA2 model includes an additional output variable related to quality. In the 
analysis within this industry it is important to consider the quality of the service 
supplied. Some diverse variables are used in the literature in order to account for 
quality: number of interruptions in supply40, water losses47, number of hours of daily 
supply30, coverage of the service or population served50, number of analyses of water 
sanitation control29, etc. In this research, the number of parameters identified in water 
analysis -organoleptics, physical-chemical and microbiological- are used as a proxy for 
quality. In the literature, two different focuses are applied to consider quality: On the 
one hand, quality is included in a second stage analysis, normally a Tobit regression, 
using as a dependent variable the results obtained for efficiency40,47. On the other hand, 
quality is incorporated as an output variable in the model30,50. The latter is the focus 
used in this research; thus making it possible to obtain from the DEA2 model net 
efficiency results in terms of the influence of quality.  
 
The DEA3 model incorporates to the basic model a desirable input, hydraulic yield. 
This variable is a proxy of the degree of renovation in the supply network as well as the 
age of this network; therefore, it is related to the investment effort made by companies. 
From a corporative point of view, a greater hydraulic performance can mean lower costs 
in water capture, water treatment and water pumping. From a social point of view, the 
reduction in water loss is welcome due to its environmental implications. As it is a 
desirable input, the inverse value is considered51; this transformation makes it possible 
to account for the transformed variables as a traditional input. 
 





In this section, programmatic efficiency is estimated for each of the models specified in 
the above section. In Table 4 the results of the Mann-Whitney rank tests between the 
two programs –public and private- are shown.   
 
 
Table 4. Mann-Whitney rank statistic results 
 
                     Mean of DMU ranks 
Models n1 n2 n R1 U Z Public Private 
DEA1 67 53 120 4 888.5 940.5 -4.4127 72.96 44.75 
DEA2 67 53 120 4 855.0 974.0 -4.2357 72.46 45.38 
DEA3 67 53 120 4 423.0 1 406.0 -1.9527 66.01 53.53 
DEA4 67 53 120 4 413.0 1 416.0 -1.8999 65.87 53.72 




The Z statistic obtained for the basic DEA1 model (Z=-4.4127) makes it possible to 
reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level of significance, thus allowing to conclude that 
both types of management have significant programmatic differences. Moreover, the 
negative sign of the Z statistic shows that public governance is less efficient than private 
governance. This model offers net efficiency measurements of the effect of economies 
of customer density and economies of production density. Therefore, taking into 
consideration environmental factors, private management is superior to public 
management in order to reduce costs. Thus, privatization would be associated with an 
improvement in terms of efficiency and cost minimization. 
 
In the DEA2 model the quality effect is included, obtaining a Mann-Whitney statistic 
equal to Z=-4.2357, which is only slightly less than that obtained in the previous model. 
The null hypothesis of equality in the distribution of the efficiency results is also 
rejected in this case with the same level of significance. Its negative value shows once 
again the superiority of private management over public management. Hence, the 
consideration of quality does not modify the initial result. In the public-private debate, 
one of the reasons to reject the option of privatization is the supposed loss in quality 
associated with this option. These results do not support this belief. 
 
The DEA3 model takes into account hydraulic performance as a proxy of the degree of 
renovation and the age of the network. The Mann-Whitney statistic corresponding to 
this model is Z=-1.9527 which does not allow to reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % 
level of significance. These results indicate that the inter-program difference does not 
remain, and therefore there is no type of management which is superior to the other in 
terms of efficiency. Although private companies are more efficient in cost reduction, 
they are inferior in terms of their hydraulic efficiency. Public companies could face a 
great number of objectives, and they could consider the conservation of hydraulic 
resources within these objectives. This objective is less evident in private firms.  
 
However, every private company in the sample experienced a process of privatization 
immediately before the start of the period considered in this study, or in the first years 
of this period. The relatively short period of time involved cannot lead to the conclusion  
that the state of the network has deteriorated due to privatization. Therefore, how can 
this result be explained? The decision regarding the privatization of water management 
can be related with the degree of renovation and the age of the network. When a public 
company faces important investments in the network, the local council could decide to 
privatize. This could be attributed to the funding limitations of local governments. 
However, local politicians can also consider the necessary increase in tariffs to be 
contrary to their electoral interests. Thus, privatization could be seen as a way to elude 
this responsibility. Consequently, another of the common arguments against 
privatization could be deemed less important: the rise in tariffs after privatization; which 
would not be motivated by the search for private profit, but by the expenses that 
renovation of a low quality network would demand. 
 
Model DEA4 simultaneously considers quality and hydraulic performance. The Mann-
Whitney statistic has a value equal to Z=-1.8999. This value confirms the previous 
results. 






In this paper, programmatic efficiency has been calculated for public and private 
companies, using incomplete panel data for 20 water supply companies in Southern 
Spain. Disregarding the effect of the economies of customer density and economies of 
production density, the superiority of private governance is found in terms of cost 
reduction. 
 
The consideration of the quality of the supplied water does not modify the previous 
result. Therefore, it is no confirmation of the supposed loss in quality associated with 
the privatization phenomenon, at least with reference to the quality of the water supplied 
to the end user.  
 
However, the differences between both governance options disappear if hydraulic yield 
is taken into consideration as a proxy of the degree of renovation network; private 
companies are more efficient in cost reduction, but they have less hydraulic efficiency 
than public ones. This could be explained by the fact that public companies have 
numerous objectives, including the conservation of hydric resources, which may be less 
evident in the case of private firms. 
 
Due to the short period of time elapsed since the privatization of the companies, it is not 
yet possible to state with certainty whether or not the state of the network has 
deteriorated after the introduction of private management. The decision regarding the 
privatization of the water service can be related to the degree of renovation and the age 
of the network. When heavy investments in the network are needed, local governments 
can opt for privatization. The strong financial restrictions that municipalities face and 
the political unpopularity derived from increases in tariffs could explain this decision. 
Therefore, increases in tariffs after privatization could not be motivated by the search 
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